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Abstract
Credit purchases of consumer goods are commonly made upon terms governed
by an agreement between the lender and the seller. This type of purchase is
generally subject to a legal principle of joint responsibility under which the lender
and the seller are jointly liable to the consumer for breach of the sale contract
by the seller.
We study the rationale for this principle in situations where market failure
arises because consumers underestimate the risk of product failure - for example
due to seller misrepresentation - and it is diﬃcult to enforce seller responsibility.
We show that joint responsibility increases welfare and reduces the incentives of
sellers to misrepresent the quality of their products.
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1 Introduction
When a consumer makes a purchase on credit she enters two contractual relationships:
the sale contract with the seller and the credit contract with the lender. An issue much
debated by policy makers is whether in the context of such credit purchases the lender
should be jointly liable with the seller for breach of the sale contract by the seller.
In most industrialized countries, including members of the EU and in the US, credit
purchases are regulated by a principle of joint responsibility (JR) whenever credit is
advanced by a lender pursuant to an agreement with the seller (referred to as ‘linked
credit ’). This is the case for example when the seller and the lender are part of a joint
venture or when the seller acts as a credit intermediary.1 Under JR, the seller and the
lender are jointly liable to the consumer for defective products or misrepresentation by
the seller. Instead, when credit is provided by a lender with no commercial links to the
seller (referred to as ‘independent credit ’), the more usual regime of seller responsibility
(SR) applies. Under SR, the seller is the only party liable for breaching the sale
contract.
The JR principle was first introduced in the UK by the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
The British example was then followed by other countries and its principles appear in
the Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule (1976) of the United States, and in the
European Directive EEC/102/87. The JR principle is also contained in the proposal
for the drafting of the new European Directive.2
1In some countries (e.g. the UK) credit-card agreements are also regulated by the joint-
responsibility principle.
2Modified proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit
agreements for consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC (October 7, 2005 COM(2005)
483 final). Amended draft of the Austrian Presidency (April 4, 2006). http://www.responsible-
credit.net/index.php?id=1884
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The reasoning behind the adoption of the JR principle in the UK can be found in
the Crowther Report which argued that JR can help to overcome the diﬃculties of
enforcing seller responsibility, which arise because litigation is costly and because the
seller can go bankrupt before the consumer is able to obtain redress.3 In particular the
Report states (paras. 6.6.24):
“If [...] the seller seeks to boost sales by making false representations, or
supplies good which are defective, is it right that the lender should be able to
disclaim all responsibility and insist on repayment of the loan being punc-
tually maintained? [...] “There are many reasons why in practice a legal
right which the buyer may have against the seller is not suﬃcient protec-
tion. [...] in some cases the seller’s financial position is so poor that it is
doubtful whether he will be able to meet the judgement even if the buyer is
successful. [...]
Empirical research confirms the concerns voiced in the Report. According to the
Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT, 2004), the largest cause of consumer complaints in the
UK is ‘defective products and substandard services’, which accounts for nearly 50% of
the total complaints. In about 20% of these cases, consumers encountered problems in
obtaining adequate redress, or there was an attempt by the seller to restrict his liability.
In about 25% of cases, consumers claimed that there was seller misrepresentation or
lack of adequate information.
When the lender is jointly responsible for product failure and for misrepresentation
by the seller, consumer protection is increased for two main reasons. First, consumers
3Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit, under the presidency of Lord Crowther, March
1971.
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who buy through linked credit can use the deep pockets of the lender to obtain redress
when the seller has gone bankrupt. It has indeed been estimated that in the UK 95%
by volume of the claims under JR arise from the seller going out of business (OFT,
1995). Second, the consumers can withhold disputed repayments of the loan pending
a final court decision, which saves them some of the loss associated with an ineﬃcient
judicial system. This is particularly relevant in countries like Italy where the duration
of ordinary civil proceedings is 70% longer than the EU average and where legal interest
rates often fail to compensate consumers for such a long wait (see Marchesi, 2003).
In this paper we investigate the desirability of the JR principle given the diﬃculties
of enforcing SR. We discuss the impact that the JR principle has on the incentives of
sellers and lenders to make linked-credit agreements, on the eﬃciency of these agree-
ments, and, crucially, on social welfare.
We build a model with a monopolistic product market and a perfectly competitive
credit market. Consumers decide whether to buy one unit of product; they are risk
neutral and alike in their preferences. Depending on their initial endowment of wealth,
two classes of consumers are identified: the poor, who must borrow to finance their
purchases, and the rich, who can buy for cash if they wish. Whether a consumer
is rich or poor is unobservable and borrowing is costly. Product failure occurs with
positive probability and it is verifiable ex post but the seller escapes liability with
positive probability. Credit supply can take two forms: independent credit and linked
credit. Under independent credit, the seller and the lender operate independently and
each maximizes its own profit; under linked credit, they operate as a joint venture
and maximize joint profits. We derive endogenously the conditions under which a
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linked-credit agreement is formed.
We focus on the possibility that consumers misperceive, and in particular underes-
timate, the risk of product failure. This assumption can be justified on two separate
grounds. First, as we show in the paper, the seller has incentives to manipulate con-
sumers’ perceptions of product risk by misrepresenting the quality of his product.
This possibility has also been suggested by legal scholars (see e.g. Hanson and Kysar
(1999a) and by industry regulators (OFT, 1997); empirical research also confirms this
prediction. Hanson and Kysar (1999b, 2000), for example, provide evidence of mis-
representation in the food and pharmaceutical sectors, and for products marketed as
environmentally friendly. They show that although consumers may be aware of manip-
ulative practices and approaches, they appear to be generally unaware of the extent to
which those tactics succeed.4 Second, an extensive literature in psychology shows that
people systematically underestimate the probability that adverse events will occur to
them. This ‘optimism’ is viewed as inherent to human nature and its pervasiveness
is shown in a relation to a wide range of events, including health risks, injuries in car
accidents, mugging and divorce. See for example Weinstein (1980), Perloﬀ and Fetzer
(1986), Baker and Emery (1993), and Harris and Middleton (1994).5 This exogenous
view of consumer misperceptions has been applied by economists and legal scholars to
4A related paper is Boyer, Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1984) who assume that sellers can engage in
misleading advertising to raise consumers’ subjective probability of high product quality. Their paper
investigates the conditions on market characteristics under which misleading advertising arises.
5The consent on consumers being inherently optimistic is however not unanimous and empirical
justifications supporting the opposite argument have also been provided (see e.g. Viscusi, 1996 and
Schwarts, 1992). We note that consumers often buy extended warranties (generally for their electronic
appliances) that are typically overpriced. In these cases consumers would also appear to exhibit pes-
simism rather than optimism. In fact, the endogeneous view of optimism explains this only apparent
contradition by pointing out that sellers have incentives to undertake hard sale practices and make
misleading claims in order to convince consumers to overestimate the value of an extended warranty.
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the study of market performance in a number of fields.6 Mostly importantly in the
present context, it has been used to support the need for product-liability legislation;
see for example the seminal papers by Spence (1977) and Polinsky and Rogerson (1983).
However, these studies have neither discussed lender liability in the presence of con-
sumer misperceptions nor have they endogenized the degree of optimism by considering
the incentives of the seller to misrepresent product risk.
We start by considering the benchmark case where consumers do not misperceive
product risk. We emphasize two points. First, when consumers have correct beliefs
linked-credit agreements help to achieve market eﬃciency. Through linked-credit the
seller price discriminates between the rich and the poor, which makes it profitable to
induce poor consumers to enter the market when their utility is positive. The idea that
linked credit is a price discrimination device was first proposed by Brennan, Maksimovic
and Zechner (1988) and it has recently found empirical support in Bertola, Hochguertel
and Koeniger (2005).7 The second point that we emphasize is that when consumers
do not misperceive the risk of product failure there is no rationale for the JR principle.
This is because JR yields the same level of welfare as SR.
Compared to the above benchmark, we show that optimism about the probabil-
ity of product failure hurts consumers and benefits the seller. By underestimating
the risk of product failure, consumers overestimate the expected value of the product
and this enables the seller to raise the price and appropriate a ‘misperception rent’.
6For example, Eisenberg (1995) points out how optimism by parties in a contract can explain
why courts do not always fully enforce contractual terms. De Meza and Suthey (1996) discuss how
optimism may explain the high failure rates of small businesses.
7Alternative reasons for credit to be packaged with sales to consumers have also been suggested,
including promoting purchases and reducing transaction costs (e.g., Wertenbroch, 2003). The main
insights of our paper would continue to hold also under this alternative framework.
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More importantly, linked-credit agreements can now be welfare reducing; through price
discrimination the seller may now induce entry from the poor when their utility is neg-
ative.
When we allow for optimism we also show that SR and JR are no longer equivalent:
under JR welfare is greater. This stems from the other facet of optimism: consumers
underestimate the value of the additional protection brought by JR because they un-
derestimate the risk of product failure. The additional protection brought by JR has
then the eﬀect of reducing the misperception rent that the seller can extract out of
consumer misperceptions. This in turn has a positive eﬀect on welfare for two rea-
sons. First linked-credit agreement may become again welfare enhancing. Second, JR
increases welfare also because it reduces the incentives of the seller to misrepresent the
quality of his products.
Our results are derived under the assumption that consumers have homogeneous
beliefs: they all underestimate the risk of product failure. In the last part of the paper
we consider the case of heterogeneous consumers and show that even if the presence of
consumers with correct beliefs is likely to help to protect optimistic consumers, it may
not suﬃce.
Overall, our results support the JR principle as it can never be worse than SR and
it can be better. Legislation is then needed because JR reduces the profitability of
linked-credit agreements and therefore it is a form of consumer protection that sellers
and lenders have no interest in oﬀering voluntarily. Consistent with this result, we find
that the JR principle has been opposed by financial companies in various countries (see
OFT, 1995).
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The desirability of lender liability for product failure is an issue almost unexplored
by the economics literature. One important exception is Iossa and Palumbo (2004)
where we consider a private-information setting in which lender liability is used as a
device for signalling the reliability of the seller. In that context, and contrary to the
case analyzed here, the lender undertakes liability for product failure voluntarily. In
both contexts, JR is welfare enhancing because of informational problems. A similar
insight is informally discussed in Shavell (1987). Lender liability has instead been
extensively analyzed in the field of environmental regulation where the lender can be
liable for the environmental damage caused by the firm that it finances. Pitchford
(1995) and Boyer and Laﬀont (1997) show that full lender liability can induce the firm
to underinvest in accident prevention and the lender to restrict lending. A group of
comments by Balkenborg (2001) and Lewis and Sappington (2001), and a reply by
Pitchford (2001) discuss respectively the role of the damage technology and of the
distribution of bargaining power in the 1995 paper by Pitchford.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic
model. We discuss the benchmark case of consumers with correct beliefs in section
3, and analyze the eﬀect of optimism under SR and under JR in section 4. We study
the incentives for linked credit in section 5. In section 6 we endogenize the level of
optimism by studying the incentives of sellers to engage in misrepresentation, while
in Section 7 we consider the case of heterogenous consumers. Section 8 concludes by
discussing some extensions of the model such as the case where product failure results
in damages. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to an appendix.
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2 The basic model
We consider a perfectly competitive credit market and a monopolistic product market.
In the product market, the product is produced at a constant marginal cost, for sim-
plicity normalized to zero, and it is oﬀered for sale at a price p. A proportion d ∈ (0, 1]
of the goods is revealed defective after sale; product failure can be verified by third
parties such as courts.8
Consumers derive utility from only one unit of the good and are alike in their
preferences: they attach valueB > 0 to the good if it is not defective and zero otherwise.
There are two classes of consumers, the rich and the poor, all of whom are risk neutral;
we normalize to 1 the total number of consumers and denote by r the fraction of rich
consumers. Rich consumers have suﬃcient money to purchase the good for cash if they
wish, whilst poor consumers must always resort to the credit market. Class membership
is unobservable. For simplicity, we assume that access to credit is unlimited and that
consumers never default on their loans.
The credit market faces a perfectly elastic supply of funds at an exogenously de-
termined interest rate, which we take as zero. However, the supply of loans entails
positive transaction costs t. The interest rate charged to consumers is denoted by i.
Credit supply can take two forms. A lender may operate independently of the seller
and due to perfect competition charge an interest rate satisfying ip = t. Alternatively,
he may sign an agreement with the seller in order to coordinate price and interest rate
decisions. In this case the seller and the lender act as a joint venture and share the
8The term “defective” will be used throughout to represent also situations where the good is not
delivered, it is delivered with delay or it is not in conformity with the standards specified in the sale
contract.
9
same information. We shall refer to the first scenario as ‘independent credit’ and to
the second one as ‘linked credit’. In practice linked credit and independent credit are
diﬀerent. Under linked credit, the seller acts as an intermediary for the lender: he
arranges credit for his customers and receives the cash price directly from the lender.
Thus, the consumer bears no expenditure at the time of the purchase, that is, when the
quality of the product is still unknown. Instead, under independent credit, the lender
hands over the cash to the consumer. The payment to the seller is then made by the
consumer at the time she makes the purchase.
We assume that the seller is unable to sell on credit without the financial support of
a lender. This seems realistic: in practice sellers may be unable to oﬀer credit directly
for they lack the technology to screen consumers appropriately and/or to diversify
default risk.9 We also assume it prohibitive the transaction cost associated with the
consumer proving to the seller that she has received a loan from an independent lender
and is indeed using that loan to finance her purchase. Thus, the seller is unable to
observe whether a consumer obtained credit from an independent lender or is using
her own wealth to finance her purchase. This implies that the seller cannot price
discriminate between the rich and the poor through the price only.10
The liability regime depends on the form of credit. Under independent credit, the
consumer is subject to a regime of seller responsibility (SR) where only the seller is
responsible for breach of the sale contract. Of course, SR also applies to cash purchases.
We take a positive approach to the liability legislation and assume that the legal liability
9In any case, our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we assumed that the seller could
oﬀer credit directly; the linked-credit agreement of our model would then simply represent a situation
where the seller is oﬀering credit himself.
10Our results would continue to hold if we assumed that the seller were able to distinguish whether
the consumer is using cash or independent credit, but were forced by law to charge a uniform price.
10
of the seller is equal to the cash price p, which the seller must return to the consumer
upon discovery that the product is defective.11 Furthermore, we assume that enforcing
SR is diﬃcult and this results in the seller bearing only a proportion γ < 1 of his legal
liability (or equivalently meeting his obligations with probability γ < 1). There are
various reasons why in practice sellers may evade their responsibilities. First, judicial
enforcement may be ineﬃcient and result in lengthy trials or long waiting times for
trials to go before the court. In this case γ captures the possibility that the legal
interest rate fails to compensate the consumer for the wait. Second, the seller may go
out of business before the consumer obtains redress; here γ represents the likelihood
that the seller is still in business.
The liability regime that applies when the consumer finances her purchase through
credit provided by a linked lender, is either one of seller responsibility (SR) or one of
joint responsibility (JR). Under JR, the lender becomes jointly liable with the seller
for product failure. This implies that an aggrieved consumer acquires the right to
stop repaying her loan to the lender pending a court decision and if the product is
discovered defective she does not need to repay the lender . This simple fact implies
that JR increases consumer protection since it ensures that the consumer pays for the
product only if it is not defective. Going back to our previous examples, the consumer
is not aﬀected by the risk that the seller goes bankrupt before he fulfils his obligations.
Also, she does not suﬀer from the sluggishness of the judicial system, for she keeps the
money in her pocket during the dispute.12
11In a previous version we assumed that the liability of the seller was given by B. This had no eﬀect
on the quality of our results.
12Given our specification of the seller legal liability, JR also oﬀers the advantage that it covers
interest repayments. While we recognize that this introduces an asymmetry into the model, the
11
In the light of the above discussion, and assuming a unitary discount factor, when
the consumer purchases the good for cash, her (net) expected utility is
uS (p) = (1− d)B − (1− dγ)p (1)
while, if she obtains credit but SR still applies, her net surplus is
vS (p, i) = (1− d)B − (1− dγ)p− ip (2)
Instead, if she obtains credit under JR, the consumer obtains
vJ (p, i) = (1− d) (B − (1 + i) p) (3)
We assume that consumers are optimistic: either because it is in their nature or
because they are susceptible to seller’s manipulation, they underestimate the risk of
product failure. The degree of consumers optimism is assumed exogenous and given
by d − bd > 0. We relax this assumption in Section 6. Note that one consequence of
consumers being optimistic is that they underestimate the value of legal protection,
that is, the expected compensation they receive from the seller under SR: (d− bd)γ > 0.
This is the other facet of optimism, and, as we shall see, it plays an important role in
what follows.13
Overoptimism implies that consumers have an incorrect perception of their surplus
from consumption. The ‘perceived (net) utilities’ corresponding to (1), (2), (3), are
quality of our results would not change if we assumed that the liability of the seller were equal to
p(1 + i) rather than p.
13One could as well assume that consumers also overestimate the compensation they receive from
the seller under SR (or the likelihood of obtaining it): γ−bγ ≤ 0, where bγ denote the consumers’ beliefs
about γ. Our results would remain qualitatively unchanged provided dγ − bdbγ > 0,that is, provided
that the misperception of the probability of product failure is more severe than that of the likelihood
of obtaining compensation (see Iossa and Palumbo, 2007).
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given by
buS (p) = (1− bd)B − (1− bdγ)p (4)
bvS (p, i) = (1− bd)B − (1− bdγ)p− ip (5)
bvJ (p, i) = (1− bd) (B − (1 + i)p) (6)
The unit profit of the seller on cash or independent-credit transactions under SR is
ωS (p) = (1− dγ)p (7)
Under linked credit the seller and lender set the price and the interest rate so as
to maximize joint profits and then distribute these joint profits between themselves
through a monetary transfer. Perfect competition in the credit market gives the mo-
nopolistic seller all the bargaining power and hence the possibility to appropriate the
entire surplus. The unit profit that the seller makes on a linked-credit purchase under
JR is therefore
πJ (p, i) = p− d(1 + i)p+ ip− t (8)
Instead, if SR also applies to linked-credit purchases, the unit profit of the seller
becomes
πS (p, i) = p (1− dγ) + ip− t (9)
Finally, while the surplus from selling to a consumer who buys for cash is always
positive
wR ≡ (1− d)B > 0
we assume that the surplus from selling to a consumer who buys on credit may be
either positive or negative, depending on the transaction cost of credit.
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Assumption 1.
(A1a): wP ≡ (1− d)B − t > 0
(A1b): wP ≡ (1− d)B − t < 0
Thus, under (A1a) welfare is maximized when both the rich and the poor purchase the
product, with the rich buying for cash and the poor on credit. Under (A1b), only cash
transactions are eﬃcient: the poor should not buy. Denoting byW ∗ the first best level
of welfare, we have
W ∗ =
½
wRr + wP (1− r) if (A1a) holds
wRr if (A1b) holds
(10)
3 Correct beliefs and linked credit
This section briefly illustrates the benchmark where consumers have correct beliefs.
We highlight three things that are important when considering the desirability of the
JR principle. First, linked credit is a device that makes it possible for the seller to price
discriminate between rich and poor consumers. Second, in the absence of optimism,
allowing for price discrimination, and thus for linked credit, is welfare enhancing. Third,
in the absence of optimism, SR and JR are equivalent.
To see this, consider the case where SR applies to linked credit. Under independent
credit, from (1) and (2), the reservation price of the rich is higher than that of the poor
because the poor can only buy on credit and credit costs ip = t. Since the seller cannot
distinguish between rich and poor consumers, he has two relevant options. Either he
sets the price equal to the reservation price of the rich and thus sells only to them, or
he lowers the price up to the reservation price of the poor and serves the whole market.
The profit of the seller in each of these two cases are respectively wRr and wP and it
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follows that under independent credit the seller’s profit is given by
ΩS =
½
wP under (A1a) if wP ≥ wRr
wRr under (A1a) if wP ≤ wRr, or under (A1b)
(11)
The pricing choice of the seller results in market failure when (A1a) holds but
wP ≤ wRr. In this case entry from the poor is eﬃcient from a welfare point of view but
unprofitable for the seller.
Linked credit can correct this ineﬃciency by allowing coordination of price and
interest rate decisions, which in turn allows the seller to price discriminate between rich
and poor consumers. By setting i = iS = 0 and p = pS, where pS solves uS(pS) = 0,
the seller can induce rich and poor consumers to separate: the rich buy for cash whilst
the poor buy on credit.14 The seller extracts the whole social surplus and its profit is
given by
ΠS =W ∗ =
½
wRr + wP (1− r) under (A1a)
wRr under (A1b)
(12)
In this setting, imposing JR on linked-credit agreements has no impact on welfare or
on the choice of the seller as to whether to make a linked-credit agreement: the seller
would fully transfer the additional liability cost of the lender into a higher interest
rate and replicate the equilibrium that arises under SR. In particular, he would charge
p = pS and i = iJ , where iJ solves vJ(pS, iJ) = 0, and make profit ΠJ = ΠS.
Proposition 1 When consumers have correct beliefs, linked-credit agreements have a
positive impact on welfare and the joint responsibility principle is ineﬀective.
14Note that at p = pS and i = iS = 0, rich consumers do not gain from switching to credit since
uS(pS) = vS(pS , iS).
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4 Overoptimism
Overoptimistic consumers are led by incorrect beliefs and this aﬀects their willingness
to pay. A measure of the extent to which optimism can hurt consumers is given by
the diﬀerence between perceived and real utility, as denoted by ∆vi ≡ bvi (.)− vi (.) for
i = S, J , and ∆uS ≡ buS (.)− uS (.) .
Under SR, from (1) and (4), (2) and (5), we have
∆vS = ∆uS (13)
∆vS = (d− bd)B − (d− bd)γp (14)
According to expression (13) under SR the eﬀect of optimism is the same for cash
and credit consumers. This holds because credit consumers must repay their debt to
the lender regardless of whether the product is defective. Expression (14) captures the
eﬀect of misperception on consumers’ willingness to pay. Since optimistic consumers
underestimate the risk of product failure, the first term in (14) is positive. The second
term is negative and represents the diﬀerence between the real and perceived value of
consumer protection, given the liability of the seller p. The diﬀerence between these
two terms is non-negative, i.e. ∆vS ≥ 0, for any price and interest rate that induce
consumers to buy, that is for any p and i such that bvS(p, i) ≥ 0.
The extent to which consumers may be hurt by their misperception, given by ∆vS,
decreases with the size of the seller liability. By increasing the liability from p to
L ≡ 1γB > p, full protection, i.e. ∆vS = ∆uS = 0, could be achieved.15 ,16 Increasing
15Note that only if γ = bγ = 1 will L equate utilities across states (as in Spence, 1977; and Polinsky
and Rogerson, 1983). If bγ > γ the perceived utility in the bad state is greater than the real utility.
Therefore, L must be greater than the loss (B) suﬀered by consumers in the event of product failure.
16Note that if dγ were lower than bdbγ, consumers would overestimate protection and imposing a
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protection when consumers are optimistic is always beneficial for consumers because
optimistic consumers underestimate the value of the additional protection and therefore
are not willing to fully pay for it. Consequently, the seller cannot fully transfer the
cost of an increase in liability into a higher price (or interest rate).
Two considerations follow. First, our assumption that the legal liability of the
seller is given by p rather than L reflects the diﬃculty for policy makers in computing
L because of lack of information on the relevant parameters. Overoptimism would not
be an issue if the optimal level of liability could be placed upon the seller. The second
and more important consideration is that, since JR increases consumer protection, the
extent to which consumers can be hurt by their optimism is lower under JR than under
SR. By comparing (14) and ∆vJ where ∆vJ = (d− bd)(B− p(1+ i)) (from (3) and (6))
the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 1 ∆vS > ∆vJ for any p and i such that buiP (p, i) ≥ 0, i = S, J.
5 Incentives for linked-credit agreements
5.1 Independent credit
Consider the case where consumers are optimistic and let bpS denote the reservation
price of the rich and bqS denote the reservation price of the poor in the presence of
optimism where bpS and bqS solve respectively: buS ¡bpS¢ = 0 and bvS ¡bqS, ibqS = t¢ = 0,
and where bqS < bpS. If the seller sets p = bpS, he sells only to the rich and his profit is
(from (1) and (7))
ΩS(bpS) = ¡wR − uS(bpS)¢ r (15)
positive liability on the seller would not be optimal.
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where −uS
¡bpS¢ > 0. Compared to the case of correct beliefs (expression (11)) charging
the reservation price of the rich yields the seller greater profits. This ‘misperception
rent’ is given by −uS
¡bpS¢ r > 0 and it arises because optimism allows the seller to
charge a higher price, bpS > pS.
If instead the seller sets bqS, he sells to both the rich and the poor and obtains (from
(2) and (7))
Ω(bqS) = ¡wR − uS(bqS)¢ (16)
The misperception rent is now given by −uS(bqS) > 0.
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we shall restrict our attention to the case
where Ω(bpS) > Ω(bqS), so that under independent credit the seller sets p = bpS and sells
only to the rich. Comparing (15) with (16), this occurs if r is suﬃciently high.17
In the light of this, the level of welfare under independent credit is given by
W S = Ω(bpS) + uS(bpS)r (17)
= wRr
From (17) and (10), when (A1a) holds under independent credit there is a welfare
loss: entry from the poor is eﬃcient from a welfare point of view but it does not occur
because it is unprofitable for the seller. Instead, when (A1b) holds under independent
credit welfare is maximized: entry from the poor is ineﬃcient and it does not occur.
17In particular if
r
1− r ≥
wR − uS(bqS)
−uS(bpS) + uS(bqS)
where −uS(bpS) + uS(bqS) > 0 since bpS > bqS . We discuss the case where the above does not hold at
the end of section 5.
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5.2 Linked credit
5.2.1 Seller Responsibility
Let us consider the case where SR applies to linked credit. As in the case of correct
beliefs, linked credit allows the seller to price discriminate between the rich and the
poor. However, as we show below, contrary to the case of correct beliefs, linked credit
may now cause ineﬃciencies.
When (A1a) holds, entry from the poor generates a positive surplus (wP > 0). With
linked credit, the seller can then extract this surplus and perfectly price discriminate
between rich and poor by setting i =biS = 0 and p = bpS so that
buS(bpS) = bvS(bpS,biS) = 0
The seller will then also gain a misperception rent uS(bpS) from both classes of consumers
and make profit equals
ΠS(bpS,biS) = wRr + wP (1− r)− uS(bpS) (18)
Under (A1b), entry from the poor is detrimental to welfare (wP < 0). However,
because of the misperception rent, inducing the poor to buy will still be profitable
if wP − uS(bpS) > 0. Assuming w.l.g. that linked credit occurs only if the seller
makes profits strictly greater than under independent credit, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 When seller responsibility applies to linked credit, linked credit is wel-
fare enhancing under (A1a) whilst it creates a welfare loss under (A1b) if
wP − uS(bpS) > 0 (19)
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and it has no eﬀect otherwise.
As in the case of correct beliefs (Proposition 1), under SR, linked credit is welfare
enhancing when (A1a) holds, but it is now socially harmful in case (A1b) when (19)
holds. With optimism the seller manages to induce poor consumers to buy the product
even if their utility is a negative.
Denoting byWS the level of welfare under SR and taking into account the conditions
under which linked credit occurs, we have
WS =
½
ΠS(bpS,biS) + uS(bpS) = wRr + wP (1− r) under (A1a), or (A1b) if wP − uS(bpS) > 0
ΩS(bpS) + uS(bpS)r = wRr (A1b) if wP − uS(bpS) < 0
(20)
Comparing (20) with (10), and in light of Proposition 4, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 With seller responsibility, a welfare loss arises when (A1b) and condition
(19) hold.
5.2.2 Joint responsibility
Under JR consumer protection is greater than under SR, which, as suggested in Lemma
1, implies that the consumer is better oﬀ under JR than under SR. We now show
that JR ensures full consumer protection and alignes the seller’s incentives to enter a
linked-credit agreement with social-welfare maximization: under JR, linked credit (and
therefore entry from the poor) is profitable as well as socially optimal if (A1a) holds,
whilst it is neither profitable nor socially optimal if (A1b) holds.
Under JR, when (A1a) holds the seller will price discriminates between the rich and
the poor by setting p and i such that (i) the poor buy on credit and their perceived
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utility is zero and (ii) the rich buy for cash. This leads to p = bpS and i = biJ , where biJ
solves
buS(bpS) = bvJ(bpS,biJ) = 0
Two things then follow. First, the seller cannot extract any misperception rent out of
those consumers who buy the product under linked credit. This occurs because under
JR the consumer who buys on credit pays for the product only if the product is not
defective, and thus misperception over the probability that the product is defective
does not matter. In particular, at bvJ(bpS,biJ) = 0 we have p (1 + i) = B, which implies
vJ(B/ (1 + i) , i) = 0. Second, the rich are not protected by JR; since the seller loses
from JR, he sets the interest rate so as to dissuade the rich from switching to credit.
In the light of this, under (A1a), the seller’s profit is given by
ΠJ(bpS,biJ) = [wR − uS(bpS)]r + wP (1− r) (21)
whilst under (A1b) his profit is (15).
Denoting byW J the level of welfare under JR and taking into account the conditions
under which linked credit occurs, we have
W J =
½
ΠJ(bpS,biJ) + uS(bpS)r = wRr + wP (1− r) under (A1a)
ΩS(bpS) + uS(bpS)r = wRr under (A1b) (22)
Comparing (20) with (22) we obtain.
Proposition 3 Joint responsibility increases welfare when both (A1b) and condition
(19) hold. In the remaining cases it has no impact on welfare.
Under JR, price discrimination and therefore linked credit occurs only when it is
welfare enhancing. For this reason a joint responsibility legislation helps to ensure that
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linked-credit agreements are welfare enhancing. Since JR hurts the seller, leaving the
choice of the liability regime (SR or JR) to sellers or lenders would lead to ineﬃcient
self-regulation. This provides a rationale for the existing legislation on JR.18
Corollary 2 With optimism, the seller and the lender would never oﬀer joint respon-
sibility voluntarily.
Proof. See the appendix.
6 Endogenous optimism: seller misrepresentation
Until now we have treated the degree of consumer optimism as exogenous. In this
section, we briefly relax this assumption and analyze the incentives of sellers to generate
optimism through misrepresentation. Seller misrepresentation is a well known concern
of legislators who have long since put in place legislation aimed at dealing with it. The
Misrepresentation Act 1967 in the UK and the fact that under JR the linked lender is
also liable for misrepresentation by the seller provide an example.
We assume that the seller chooses the level of misrepresentation before knowing
how a potential buyer would pay for the product. This seems realistic. We model
seller misrepresentation as the undertaking of unverifiable actions (or the making of
statements) that aﬀect consumers’ estimate of the probability of product failure bd so
as to increase or generate optimism. In particular, for any true probability d, the more
the seller engages in misrepresentation the lower is bd. For simplicity, and without loss
18Before concluding this section, recall that in section 5.1 we assumed that r is suﬃciently high that,
under (A1a), with independent credit the seller prefers to set the price equal to the reservation price
of the rich and sell only to them rather than lower the price and serve the whole market. It should
be apparent now that if we relaxed this assumption linked credit would have no eﬀect on welfare in
case (A1a). However, Proposition 3, and Corollaries 1,2, and 3 would continue to hold.
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of generality, we let γ = 0. Formally, let g(bd) denote the total cost (e.g. intensity of
the hard-sale practice) for the seller of inducing a level of misperception d − bd, with
bd = [0, d] , we assume that g(d) = 0, g0(bd) < 0, g00(bd) > 0, and lim
ed→0
g(bd) =∞.19
In this setting, it is easy to show that, given the level of bd, the seller’s choice of p
and i still follows the analysis in section 5. Now consider the optimal choice of bd for
the seller; the following result is then obtained.
Proposition 4 The joint-responsibility principle lowers the incentives of the seller to
misrepresent product quality, which generates a non-negative impact on welfare.
Proof. See the appendix.
The level of optimism under JR is lower than under SR, because JR reduces the
incentives of the seller to misrepresent product quality and the misperception rent that
the seller can extract out of consumer optimism. Since engaging in misrepresentation
constitutes a wasteful activity from a social point of view, a lower level of misrepresen-
tation raises welfare.
Note that this beneficial eﬀect of JR does not aﬀect the poor consumers only,
but it extends also to the rich who, as we have seen, always buy for cash. Since
misrepresentation is lower under JR than under SR, the misperception rent of the
seller is smaller, and all consumers are better oﬀ.
The results of this section show how JR is good for providing incentives to reduce
seller misrepresentation. This is important since previous results in the context of
19An alternative modelling choice could be to assume that misrepresentation is verifiable, although
imprecisely and at some costs. In this case, g(bd) would represent the expected fine incurred by the
seller. We believe that our simple formulation suﬃces to to capture the idea that seller misrepresen-
tation can be beneficial to the seller for it generates overoptimism, but it is costly.
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environmental regulation have suggested that lender liability may reduce the incentives
of the seller to invest in product care. In particular, Pitchford (1995) and Balkenborg
(2001) have shown how the eﬀect of lender liability on incentives for product care
depends on the distribution of the bargaining power between the firm and the lender.
The distribution of bargaining power between the seller and the lender instead plays
no role in our context.20
7 Heterogeneous consumers
In this section we allow for the possibility that some consumers have correct beliefs.
We show that since these consumers are willing to pay less for the product than the
optimistic ones, if the seller does not manage to price discriminate between the two
types of consumers, he might prefer to give up the misperception rent in order to serve
all types. Thus, the presence of consumers with correct beliefs can help to address the
market problems that may arise because of consumer optimism.
Let α denote the fraction of consumers with correct beliefs and for simplicity let
γ = 0. Without loss of generality consider the case where pS > bqS (which requires
(d − bd)B < t), so that the willingness to pay for each class of consumers is ranked as
follows
bpS > pS > bqS > qS
20In particular, when the seller has all the bargaining power lender liability reduces the incentives
for product care. This is because the higher the liability cost of the lender when the accident occurs
(and the firm lacks suﬃcient funding to compensate victims), the greater the compensating payment
which the firm will have to give to the lender in the event of no accident. This implies that the firm
has less to gain from reducing d. Instead, the choice of bd under JR does not depend on the distribution
of the bargaining power between the lender and the seller. This is because the endogenous variable isbd and not d; thus, it does not matter whether the transfer is paid in the good or bad state.
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Under Independent credit, the associated profits are
ΩS(bpS) = [wR − uS(bpS)](1− α)r
ΩS(pS) = wRr
ΩS(bqS) = £wR − uS(bqS)¤ [1− α (1− r)]
ΩS(qS) = wP
Thus, for α low and r high, the seller still prefers to set bpS, extract the misperception
rent from the rich consumers and keep the poor out of the market. But if α grows
suﬃciently high the seller prefers to set pS and give up the misperception rent in order
to sell to consumers with correct beliefs.
Consider now Linked credit. If the seller sets bpS,biS = 0, he obtains
ΠS(bpS,biS = 0) = £wR − uS(bpS)¤ (1− α)r + £wP − uS(bpS)¤ (1− α) (1− r)
whilst if he sets pS,biS = 0 he makes
ΠS(pS,biS = 0) = wRr + wP (1− r)
and again we find that for α suﬃciently high the seller gives up the mispeception rent
in order not to lose consumers with correct beliefs. The implication is that the presence
of consumers with correct beliefs increases the likelihood that linked credit only occurs
when it is welfare enhancing, as in our benchmark case of section 3. Should this occur
a joint-responsibility legislation would have no eﬀect, as in section 3.
Suppose however that the seller can oﬀer a warranty G at the price of g to his
customers. The seller will set g,G in order to separate consumers according to their
beliefs and avoid losing the misperception rent. He can do this because of the other
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facet of optimism: optimistic consumers understimate the value of additional protection
and value the warranty at bdG < dG.
To see this, consider rich consumers and suppose the seller sets bpS and oﬀers a
warranty contract {G∗, g∗} such that they self select: (i) those with correct beliefs
buy the product and warranty, (ii) those with optimistic beliefs only buy the product.
Incentive compatibility for (i) requires
uS(bpS; g,G) = (1− d)B − (1− bd)B − g + dG ≥ 0
g∗ ≤ dG− (d− bd)B
as consumers with correct beliefs are willing to buy the product only if the seller oﬀers
them a warranty that covers the misperception rent, (d− bd)B. Incentive compatibility
for (ii) requires
g∗ ≥ bdG
as optimistic consumers are not willing to pay more than bdG to have the warranty.
Combining the two conditions above, we obtain
(d− bd) (G−B) ≥ 0
Thus, if G ≥ B the seller can oﬀer a warranty rent that does not attract optimistic
consumers for the underestimation of the value of the warranty by the optimistic con-
sumers is larger than the misperception rent (d − bd)B. Taking into account that the
seller wishes to minimize G and maximize g, in equilibrium
G∗ = B;
g∗ ≤ dG∗ − (d− bd)B = bdB
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It is easy to show that, because of the possibility for the seller to oﬀer the warranty
contract above, the presence of consumers with correct beliefs no longer works as a
protection device for the optimistic ones. Indeed, when SR applies, linked credit with
{bpS, biS = 0} still occurs under (A1a) and (A1b) if (19) holds. In the first case, the
seller oﬀers the warranty contract {G∗, g∗} to all consumers and serves all of them; in
the second case, he oﬀers the warranty contract only to those consumers who buy for
cash, and serves all consumers but the poor with correct beliefs. 21 Because optimistic
consumers do not buy the warranty, the seller continues to obtain the misperception
rent from them. We summarize the results of this section below.
Proposition 5 The presence of consumers with correct beliefs can help to protect
overoptimaistic consumers but it may not suﬃce to eliminate the market failure due to
consumer optimism.
8 Discussion
We have studied the impact of a legal principle that makes the seller and the lender
jointly liable to the debtor for breach of the sale contract by the seller under linked
credit. We have shown that joint responsibility helps to correct the market failure
that can arise because of optimism and seller misrepresentation, and it helps to ensure
that linked-credit agreements are welfare enhancing. We have also shown that joint
responsibility reduces the incentives of sellers to engage in misrepresentation. The
21Note that it is suboptimal for the seller to oﬀer the warranty to all consumers. When biS = 0
under SR rich and poor behave in the same way so if the rich consumers with correct beliefs buy
the warranty so do the poor ones. With wP < 0 the seller would then make negative profit on poor
consumers with correct beliefs.
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rationale for the legal principle stems from the fact that joint responsibility reduces
market failure due to optimism but it would not be voluntarily oﬀered.
To illustrate the robustness of our results, we conclude by highlighting two possible
extensions and discussing some of the assumptions of the model.
Damage. We have assumed throughout that product failure causes no other loss
to consumers than the foregone benefit of consumption. In practice, however, product
failure may result in injuries or other types of damage. When product failure causes
damage, JR reduces but does not eliminate the ineﬃciency that can arise under SR.
Consumers can resort to the lender when the seller goes bankrupt, which increases
consumer protection, but they still need to resort to the judicial system to obtain
compensation for damages. Thus JR protects consumers from the possibility of seller
bankruptcy but not from the ineﬃciency of the judicial system. In countries with an es-
tablished tradition for protecting consumers’ interests or where consumers associations
are strong enough to ensure that consumers are fully compensated for the damages
they suﬀer, JR ensures full consumer protection (see Iossa and Palumbo, 2007 for a
formal derivation of this result) .
Heterogenous tastes. In a previous version of this paper (Iossa and Palumbo, 2007)
we showed that when consumers diﬀer in their valuation of the product, full price
discrimination through credit subsidization is no longer feasible. For high diﬀerence
in evalutations the seller may choose to supply only rich consumers also under (A1a).
When (A1a) holds it may then be socially optimal to let the seller take advantage
of consumer misperception in order to mitigate the monopoly ineﬃciency. JR will
continue to be desirable when tastes are not too heterogeneous or if the number of rich
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consumers is suﬃciently low.
Other justifications for linked credit. We have considered a situation where incen-
tives to make linked-credit agreements stem from the possibility to engage in price
discrimination. However, there may be reasons other than price discrimination to jus-
tify linked credit. For example, coordination can be a way to reduce the cost of lending,
by using the facilities of the seller to supply credit (Wertenbroch, 2003). Some of our
results extend to this setting. In particular, joint responsibility will still help to reduce
the misperception rent of the seller and the incentives of the seller to misrepresent the
quality of its product.
Market structure. We have assumed that the product market is monopolistic and
the capital market is perfectly competitive. If we expand the setting to allow for at
least some competition in the product market, the misperception rent that a seller
can appropriate would fall, which would reduce the incentives to misrepresent product
quality. The welfare gain from JR would still arise but be lower than in the case of a
monopolistic product market. Our results do not instead extend to the case of perfect
competition in both markets. The reason is twofold. First, with competitive markets
there is no scope for price discrimination (and hence for linked credit).22 Second, op-
timistic consumers would perceive themselves as worse oﬀ under joint responsibility
because perfect competition forces sellers (lenders) to fully transfer the cost of addi-
tional liability into higher prices (interest rates).23 Therefore, linked credit would not
22Note that the discussion in Section 5 does not rely on the seller pricing behavior. Thus, also under
perfect competition in the product market, i) overoptimism hurts consumers (unless the seller liability
is equal to L) and ii) JR benefits consumers by reducing the diﬀerence between their perceived and
real utilities.
23Indeed, Spence (1977) shows that under perfect competition the voluntary level of liability oﬀered
by sellers is zero.
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arise in equilibrium. However, it is also the case that under perfect competition sellers
have no incentives to engage in costly misrepresentation, and therefore optimism may
not be an issue there.
Risk aversion.
The need for JR legislation also rests on the inability of insurance markets to develop
and protect consumers from product failure. The reason is that optimistic consumers
underestimate the likelihood of product failure and thus the value of insurance for
product failure. Consumers who are suﬃciently risk averse may be willing to pay a risk
premium that is suﬃcient to cover the risk for the insurer but risk neutral consumers
would not.
9 Appendix
Proof of Corollary 3. Under (A1a), the seller earns ΠJ(bpS,biJ) under JR, and
ΠS
³bpS,biS´ under SR, where, from (18) and (21): ΠS ³bpS,biS´ > ΠJ(bpS,biJ).Under
(A1b), the seller earns ΩS(bpS) under JR and max[ΠS(bpS,biS),ΩS(bpS)], under SR.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the analysis in section 5, when (A1a) holds, the
seller makes a linked-credit agreement under both SR and JR. Let bdS and bdJ be the
level of bd that maximize respectively ΠS(bpS,biS) and ΠJ(bpS,biJ), as given by expressions
(18) and (21). We have
−∂uS(bpS(bdS))
∂ bd = g0(bdS); −∂u
S(bpS(bdJ))
∂ bd r = g0(bdJ)
implying d > bdJ > bdS. Thus, welfare increases under JR. When (A1b) holds, the seller
may make a linked-credit agreement under SR whilst he will never make it under JR.
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The eﬀect of JR on welfare then follows by noting that the level of bd that maximizes
ΩS(bpS,biS), as given by expressions (15), is bd = bdJ > bdS.
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